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We ask if corporate executives have fixed effects (“quirks”) that explain operational decisions 
made in firms, independent of firm effects.  We replicate the approach in Bertrand et al. (2003)2, 
solving the empirical challenge of distinguishing firm and executive effects by constructing a dataset 
of executives who move from one firm to another, in essence.  We find that executives indeed 
exhibit fixed effects separate from firm effects.  These quirks are large, although there is a wide 
dispersion of sizes among executives.  The quirks also come in themes, such as a bias toward 
investing in human rather than physical capital.  We also find that quirks mostly lead to inefficient 
outcomes for firms.  Finally, we link quirks to observable characteristics of executives, such as their 
age or education.  We conclude by arguing for an increased focus on individual effects in operations 
management research. 
                                                 
1 Harvard Business School.  Sherman Hall, Boston MA 02163.  Tel: (617) 495 6228, Fax: (617) 496 4397, Email: 
rlai@hbs.edu.  I thank Rob Huckman and Mark Szigety for detailed feedback.  As usual, I am grateful for guidance from 
and conversations with Ananth Raman.  All errors are mine. 
2 That is, we only claim credit for replicating their approach in a different setting.  And all errors here are ours. 
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Executive Quirks in Operational Decisions 
 
“Within General Motors, the brilliant cost cutter [purchasing and operations chief J. Ignacio 
Lopez de Arriortua] was something of a cult leader. He called his three dozen or so top disciples 
“Warriors;” they ate a “Warrior diet” (fresh fruits were in; meats and coffee were out) and had their 
own rituals. For instance, whenever a bid met their pricing target, the Warriors, like Visigoths 
hearing of a fresh kill, would lustily pound their fists on the table. For many, their loyalty was not so 
much to GM as to López himself… 
 
“Lopez also had a flair for the grand gesture. During a dinner at [G.M. CEO Jack] Smith's 
house, he dramatically stripped his watch off his left wrist and strapped it to his right, proclaiming 
he would keep it there until General Motors made record profits in North America. Smith instantly 
followed suit; within days, the Warriors had also transferred their watches from left to right wrists.” 
 
      - “Bloodfeud,” Fortune, April 14, 1997 
1. Introduction 
On Thursday, March 11, 1993, when the New York Times announced that Lopez de Arriortua 
was leaving General Motors for Volkswagen to be production director, GM’s share price dropped 
$1.375 to close at $38.75 (see also Moffet et al. (1998)).  What followed was a nuclear war of lawsuits 
between the two firms.  The media reported allegations of stolen GM blueprints for a futuristic 
“Plant X” and a secret production process called “Plateau 6,” private detectives who tailed Lopez in 
Germany, and secret settlement talks by the firms’ directors (including the former CEO of Procter 
& Gamble, former chairman of CBS, and Gerhard Schroder, now president of Germany).  There 
was even an attractive young female operative to fake a bike accident in front of a Warrior’s 
apartment, to lure him into letting her into the premise so she could stealthily uncover G.M. 
documents that might be inside. 
Not all executives with a hand in operational decisions have such colorful traits.  But other 
executives like Kevin Rollins of Dell and Larry Bossidy of Allied Signal are also sometimes reported 
as larger than life in their firms’ operational matters.  In this paper, we ask if there are executive fixed 
effects (“quirks”) associated with operational decisions on top of firm fixed effects.  If so, how big 
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are these?   Do they come in themes?  Are they good for firms?  Are there observable characteristics 
of executives that are associated with certain quirks? 
The main empirical challenge in answering these questions is to disentangle the executive and 
firm effects.   To address this, we replicate the effective approach in Bertrand et al. (2003)3.  For 
example, we solve the identification challenge by building a dataset involving executives who move 
from one firm to another.  The dependent variables are operational decisions associated with 
capacity and growth (such as property), line balancing (such as inventory), and the cash conversion 
cycle (such as receivables).  The independent variables are dummies for various types of executives, 
with suitable controls. 
We find that executives indeed exhibit fixed effects separate from firm effects.  These executive 
fixed effects, which might be called “quirks,” are large.  For example, the mean quirk for net PPE 
(property, plant, and equipment, scaled by assets) reduces it by 1.6% percentage points, compared to 
the mean PPE of 33%.  However, this mean masks a large dispersion in the size of the quirks 
among individual executives.  For net PPE, the inter-quartile range of quirks is 7%, which is very 
sizeable compared to the 33%.  Using a factor analysis, we find that the quirks come in themes.  For 
example, one set of quirks emphasizes “building” out infrastructure, with a reduction in firm value.  
Another emphasizes a bias toward human capital and against physical capital.. 
There are three possible stories for whether quirks are good for firms.  An “agency” story is that 
quirks generally lead to inefficient outcomes.  They are present because governance is poor and 
executives exploit this for private benefits.  A “sorting” story is that quirks are neutral; some quirks 
fit some firm-years better than others.  A “premium” story is that there are some quirks are good 
and some bad.  Firms pay a premium for executives with good quirks; conversely, paying “peanuts” 
                                                 
3 But all errors here are ours. 
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get “monkeys.”  We find that the agency story is most consistent with the data. 
Finally, we find that some observable characteristics of executives are associated with these 
quirks.  For example, age and tenure in the firm tend to go with lower inventory levels. 
The findings have important implications for operations management in theory and practice.  
For example, there could be a fruitful research agenda in understanding how individual effects come 
about, how they change, and more important, how they might affect the assumptions and results of 
models in operations management.  Some of these issues might come under the emerging field of 
“behavioral operations.”  Practically, the findings imply that there may be a case for managing 
agency effects arising from these quirks.  There might also be a need to sensitize executives to 
possibly subconscious biases.  Overall, and as Boudreau et al. (2003) note, “the fields of operations 
management (OM) and human resources management (HRM) have a long history of separateness.”  
We plead for greater emphasis on the study of individuals in the field of operations management. 
2. Executive Quirks on Operational Decisions 
.  It is well-known that empirically, parameters such as lead times and costs of capital explain less 
than 20% of operational performance.  For example, Netessine et al. (2005) find that the adjusted R-
squared’s for well-specified regressions of inventory turns are between 11% and 14%.  Similarly, Lai 
(2005) finds that rational causes explain only about 14% of the bullwhip effect.  A clue to what else 
might explain heterogeneity in operational setups comes from industry.  Many practitioners believe 
that it is their executives, such as those in the opening paragraphs of this paper, who create and leave 
marks on their firms’ operational decisions. 
In the theoretical literature, the question of whether individuals have an imprint on organizations 
is an ancient but empirically hard-to-answer one.  In the sphere of philosophy and politics, Tolstoy’s 
historical theory posits that much of history is not within the grasp of individuals, and Marx’s 
materialistic dialectic argues that it is social and economic forces that determine outcomes, leaving 
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little for individual maneuver.  Weber, however, argues for charismatic leadership, especially when 
the bureaucracy does not stand in the way.  These arguments have their cousins in psychology, 
economics, and the management literature.  For example, Gemmill et al. (1992), summing up the 
arguments from psychology and sociology, argue that leadership is primarily a social construct.  In 
economics, Rotemberg et al. (1993) use a model to show that certain kinds of leaders (participative 
ones) are better for shareholders when there are plenty of business opportunities, and harsher ones 
are better otherwise.  In the management literature, Weber et al. (2001) show in an experiment that 
such executive traits might not be real.  Subjects commit attribution errors, over-assigning success 
and failure to leaders rather than situations (such as group size).  Khurana (2002) argues that the 
market for CEOs is culturally determined, often because of the emphasis on charisma.  Finally, there 
is also a debate that attempts to explain the existence of individual quirks in terms of their origins – 
as disposition or learned behavior (e.g., Staw et al. (1986), Davis-Blake et al. (1989), House et al. 
(1996)). 
Our paper also builds on the related literature of human issues in operations, although the 
emphasis there is usually on worker motivation, productivity, learning, or turnover (e.g. , Cook et al. 
(2002), Gans et al. (2002); Boudreau et al. (2003) provide a comprehensive survey).  Nevertheless, 
some of the work is of relevance to our empirics.  For example, Schultz et al. (1999) show that firm 
effects such as low inventory levels might induce productivity norms, so our econometrics must take 
care of reverse causality from operational parameters to executive effects. 
To summarize, there is an abundance of theories, both for and against the importance of the 
role of individuals in organizations, to various degrees and in various contingencies. 
Empirically, there is a less in the literature.  Most of the work is in the context of science and 
technology-based settings or in psychology.  As an example of the former, Huckman et al. 
(forthcoming) report that surgeon fixed effects in a cardiac surgery setting might be hospital-
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specific, so that what is learned in one hospital can be difficult to transfer to another.  As an example 
from psychology, Staw et al. (1986) track several hundred individuals over fifty years to see how job 
attitudes might have arisen from disposition.  In the context of more general firm performance, 
Wasserman et al. (2002) look at CEO effects, but do not disentangle firm and manager effects.   
Bertrand et al. (2003), in a paper that most closely relates to ours, show that top officers (CEOs, 
CFOs, and “others”) do influence investment policies like capital expenditures and the number of 
acquisitions, financial policies like leverage and interest coverage, recurring expenditures like R&D 
spend and advertising, and two performance measures: return on assets and operating return on 
assets.  They find generally significant impact by these senior executives.  We aim to construct our 
study as closely as possible to theirs to facilitate comparison, but because of our focus on 
operational rather than their mostly financial dependent variables, there will necessarily be some 
areas of differences, which we will highlight. 
3. Data 
Our main data sources are ExecuComp, the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT tapes, Zoominfo, 
BoardAnalyst, I/B/E/S, and First Call.  We start with ExecuComp, where the data is for the period 
1992 through 2004, on mostly S&P 1,500 firms, and the five to nine highest paid executives per 
firm.  This core has 134,728 firm-executive-year observations, but only 4,003 involve an executive 
who has made at least one firm-to-firm transition.  We further restrict the sample to manufacturing, 
wholesaling, and retailing, as other industries are sufficiently different that operational comparisons 
are difficult to interpret.  Finally, we include only those executive-firm-year observations in which 
the transitioning executive stays at least three years in the before-firm and after-firm, so that there is 
sufficient time for executive effects, if any, to take hold on operational decisions.  The result is 250 
executives, 277 firms, 1951 executive-firm-years.  In all the analysis below, we repeat with just the 
top five (instead of up to nine) of the highest paid executives, as well as without the minimum three-
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year stay requirement.  The (unreported) results are qualitatively the same. 
We classify the executives into CEOs, COOs/Presidents, CFOs, operations executives, and 
others.  Operations executives are those who are not COOs and whose titles have variations of the 
words “operations,” “logistics,” “purchasing,” “mechandising,” “store,” “distribution,” and 
“supply.”  We manually inspect the titles of both operations executives and the “others” to ensure 
that is no mis-classification. 
We then merge other datasets into the ExecuComp dataset.  The main one is CRSP-
COMPUSTAT, where we use restated figures whenever they are available. 
In Table 1, panel (a), we show summary statistics of the executives.  In panel (b), we show 
transitions by executives.  Not surprisingly, some transitions such as CFO-to-operations executive 
are rare.  By way of comparison, we find that 58% of the transitions are across industry, and 
Bertrand et al. (2003) report a close 42%.  We attribute the difference to their using data from 
Forbes 800 and ExecuComp, and include only CEO, CFO, and “others.”  In panel (c), we show the 
summary statistics of the firms involved.  We observe that there is a fair amount of heterogeneity in 
the dataset.  For example, assets per firm range from $19.2 million to $123 billion.  Apart from the 
high-level variables like market capitalization or sales, we show three groups of operational variables, 
regarding capacity and growth, line balancing, and cash conversion cycle.  Our empirical strategy is 
to see if executive fixed effects can explain these as dependent variables. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
Our main challenge is to disentangle firm from executive fixed effects.  To do this, we build a 
new dataset using executive transitions between firms.  This technique has been used in studies such 
as Allison et al. (1990), Almeida et al. (1999), Groysberg et al. (2001), Bertrand et al. (2003), 
Rosenkopf et al. (2003), Song et al. (2003), and Huckman et al. (forthcoming). 
Our baseline specification is: 
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(1)  OP_PARAMETEReft = CEOeft + COOeft + CFOeft + OPSeft + OTHERSeft + 
  YEARt + FIRMf + Xeft.βeft + εeft , 
where CEO, COO, CFO, OPS, and OTHERS are the fixed effects for executive, YEARt for year, 
and FIRMf , firm.  X is a set of controls by firm and time, and ε the disturbance term for executive e 
in firm f and year t.  To clarify, if an executive moves from being COO to CEO, then this 
specification codes her before-firm effect as a COO effect and her after-firm one as CEO effect.  In 
general, however, we are interested in effects in aggregate among the top executives.  To minimize 
problems associated with endogeneity, specification errors, and serial correlation, we lag the X 
variables by a year, take the log of the X’s, and cluster around firms. 
OP_PARAMETER is one of the variables described earlier, in Table 1, panel (c).  We focus on 
three categories of these operational decisions. 
First, under capacity and growth, we pick six measures of PPE (property, plant, and equipment), 
the number of employees, rental expense, and rental commitment one year and five years out.  The 
six PPE variables measure the tangible operational capacity of the firm: total net of depreciation, 
land, buildings, machinery, leases, and those under construction.  Employees measure human capital 
capacity.  Rental expense captures the capacity such as retail space that might be leased, not owned.  
Rent commitment capture decisions on capacity growth.  Rental expense is scaled by sales, rental 
commitments by rental expense, and others by assets.  The COMPUSTAT item number for each 
variable is in the captions for the tables in the appendix. 
The second category is line balancing.  We pick lead time, order backlog, and four types of 
inventory.  Lead time in days is measured as in Netessine et al. (2005), as the log of a multiple: 
payables times 365 divided by cost of goods sold.  Order backlog is scaled by sales.  Inventory, in log 
form, include that for total, raw materials, work in progress, and finished goods. 
The third category deals with the cash conversion cycle.  Apart from inventory, which we 
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classify into the second category above, we select receivables, payables, operating cash flow, and 
change in cost of goods sold (the purchasing function highlighted for the GM executive in the 
opening paragraph).  The first two are in log form.  Operating cash flow is defined as sales less SGA 
plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by market value of assets, defined as market capitalization 
plus carrying value of preferred stock, long-term debt, and debt in current liabilities. 
We now run through a number of empirical issues in identifying equation (1). 
First, there is the question of learning.  We follow the approach in Bertrand et al. (2003).  
Executives might do better in the after-firm than the before-firm, so it could be that executive 
quirks are not found in the before-firm even if they could be found in the after-firm.  Since our goal 
is to identify the existence of executive quirks and not their relative magnitudes, learning across firms is 
not an empirical issue for us.  Specifically, if there is learning, our method will understate the level of 
executive quirks.  Although not the main message of this paper, we will document magnitudes of 
executive quirks, so it is there that any interpretation is subject to non-randomness in learning. 
Second, there is the issue of what should enter X, the control matrix of regressors.  Our overall 
strategy is to be conservative in estimating executive quirks, so we include as many variables as 
possible to pick up most plausible explanations.  We include lag values of log sales (for growth), log 
assets (for size), and log cash flow (for financial constraint).  These are also the variables used by 
Bertrand et al. (2003).  To be extra careful, we also include lagged dependent variables, but the 
specifications turn out to be invariant up to three lags, so we do not report these. 
There is one exception to this set of X’s, which is when we have inventory variables as 
dependent variables.  In these cases, we follow the practice in the literature.  Following Netessine et 
al. (2005), for example, we include the log of cost of goods sold, log gross margin, log lead time, log 
sigma sales, sales growth, log of the one-month T-bill rate, and an indicator variable for sales 
surprise.  Sigma sales is a proxy for demand uncertainty, and is calculated by first regressing sales on 
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five trend terms (t to t5) and taking the root-mean-squared error of the regressions.  The sales 
surprise indicator is 1 if sales surprise, defined as the median of the First Call analyst forecasts for 
sales at the fiscal year end date, is greater than the actual announced sales; it is 0 otherwise.  There is 
an alternative specification, from Gaur et al. (2005).  Following them, I include in X  log gross 
margin, log capital intensity (net PPE divided by net PPE plus cost of goods sold), and log sales 
surprise.  Because this has fewer regressors and a lower R-squared, I take the more conservative 
approach of reporting results using the Netessine et. al. specification, which probably captures more 
variation.  However, in unreported regressions, I find the two specifications produce the 
qualitatively similar results in terms of the existence of executive quirks. 
Third, there might be systematic changes in firms that coincide with executive transitions, so the 
specification in (1) alone does not allow identification or show causality.  Again, following Bertrand 
et al. (2003), a plausible alternative story is that firms first make certain operational decisions and 
then systematically fire or hire designated types of executives based on these decisions.  One way to 
get around this is to use exogenous variation in the timing of transitions (but we do note that the 
matching of executive characteristics to firms could not be random), arising from sudden deaths of 
incumbent executives.  This is the approach we take in a separate paper, which shows causality.  In 
this paper, for comparison with Bertrand et al. (2003) and to show methodological robustness, we 
borrow their test.  Specifically, we run control experiments in which we artificially move the 
executive transition backward by some years.  If the alternative story is true, we should see executive 
quirks even in the control experiments.  Econometrically, we first adjust the dataset so that the 
transitions are moved forward by say, three years.  Then we create firm-year residuals by regressing 
our operational decision variables on firm and year fixed effects, and time-varying firm controls.  
Third, we collapse these residuals by executive-firm periods, by taking medians of the residuals.  
Fourth, we estimate executive quirks with these residuals.  Finally, we regress the after-firm 
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executive quirks (estimated using the control transition) on the before-firm executive quirks.  If we 
find that the coefficient on the regressor is small compared with that in the actual “treatment” test, 
then there is evidence that operational decisions are not made without the involvement of the 
transitioning executive. 
After these tests of the existence and impact of executive quirks, we proceed to test for themes 
that might emerge from the data.  We take two approaches, with factor analysis and correlations.  
The former is straightforward and standard, but the latter can better account for measurement error.  
Specifically, we first regress the operations decision variables on our previous set of firm and year 
fixed effects as well as time-varying firm effects.  In the second stage, we regress the residuals from 
these regressions on executive fixed effects.  In the third stage, we estimate the correlations between 
the predicted values from the second stage regressions, using GLS (generalized least squares) with 
the known standard errors of the first stage as weights.  In this paper, we do not distinguish how 
these themes arise.  For example, they could come about because there are types of executives with 
types of quirks.  But they could also arise because of complementarities among operational 
parameters (e.g., Milgrom et al. (1995)), preventing quirks from being observed independently of 
each other. 
To investigate the efficiency implications of executive quirks, we construct tests that can 
distinguish the alternative stories of agency, sorting, and premium, all studied in Bertrand et al. 
(2003).  The agency story is distinct among the three for its prediction that executives have greater 
room to impose their quirks on weaker-governed firms. To test this, we regress quirks obtained in 
the earlier paragraph on the G (for governance) index from I/B/E/S constructed by Gompers et al. 
(2003).  The sorting story is distinct from the premium one for its prediction that there is no 
compensation premium for any executive quirk.  To test this, we first regress the log of total 
compensation and log salary on firm and year fixed effects and time-varying firm controls: lagged 
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log assets, lagged log sales, ROA, the G index, tenure of the executive in the firm, and indicator 
variables for the position of the executive (CEO, CFO, etc.).  We then regress the compensation 
residuals from the first-stage estimations on executive fixed effects.  Once again, we use GLS 
weights as before to minimize measurement error. 
Finally, we see if there are observable characteristics of their executives that correlate with their 
quirks.  We regress executive quirks from the previous regressions as follows: 
(2) EXEC_QUIRKeft = f(AGEeft , MALE?e , TENUREeft , NUM_DIRECTORSHIPSeft , 
   BBusiness?e, BEng?e, BSc?e, MBA?e ) 
where AGEeft is the age of the executive e at year t, MALE?e an indicator for whether the 
executive is male, TENUREeft the executive’s years with firm f at year t, NUM_DIRECTORSHIPSeft 
the executive’s number of directorships outside firm f in year t, BBusiness?e an indicator for whether 
the executive has a bachelor’s degree in business, BEng?e for a bachelor’s degree in engineering, BSc?e 
for a degree in science, and MBA?e  if the executive has an MBA.  The bachelor’s degree in the arts 
is used as a baseline.  These regressions are clustered at the firm level. 
5. Results 
For easier comparison, we present the results in the same order and format as those in Bertrand 
et al. (2003).  In Table 2, we report the fixed effects for different types of executives on our 
operational decision variables.  The adjusted R-squared is very high to begin with, given our strategy 
to capture as much as possible using our controls and firm and year fixed effects.  This is consistent 
with Bertrand et al. (2003), who find their baseline R-squared’s in the high 90’s.  Like them, we find 
that adding executive effects increases the R-squared.  Comparing the first row (unlabeled; no 
executive quirks) and last (labeled “All”), we see that the explanatory power for net PPE increases 
from 89% to 90% in panel (a), lead time from 79% to 81% in panel (b), and receivables from 95% 
to 96% in panel (c).  In almost all cases, the effects under “All” are significant with very low p-values.   
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Although it is not the main point of this paper to consider quirks below the aggregate “All” level, 
we note some interesting observations in the data.  The most important is that CEOs appear to have 
the most statistically significant quirks among the executives.  This is understandable since we have 
chosen only manufacturing and retailing/wholesaling firms, in which operational matters are 
strategically important.  The biggest CEO quirks are found in the forward commitment of rent, 
sourcing (change in COGS), and total and raw materials inventory.  It is possible that these are areas 
where there is better information for CEOs and where control is more easily achieved (compared 
with say, downsizing by laying off employees). 
Surprisingly, COOs do not appear to have much influence.  This could be an artifact of the 
vague functions of COOs, some of whom are responsible for vast number of functions, other are 
for operations, and still others are really just CEOs-designate.  To test if this last is in play, we select 
observations in which COOs do not become CEOs within five years of their CEOs’ departure, and 
find that the significance is still absent (unreported).  Operations executives below the level of COO 
appear to have more influence, such as in PPE leases, rent, and receivables. 
Taken altogether, I interpret the analysis to mean that executive quirks for operational decisions 
are present.  The lack of significance at the role level (i.e., CEO or COO) could mean that either 
quirks only occur at the management team level or that the average individual quirk may be small 
but the average masks a wide distribution in magnitudes among individuals.  The latter turns out to 
be true.  Table 3 shows why. 
There is wide variation in the effects among individual executives.  To see this, we compare the 
inter-quartile range of individual fixed effects with the mean of the dependent variable, labelled 
μ(DV).  We see that the inter-quartile range is often the same order of magnitude as μ(DV).  To 
minimize estimation error, we re-estimate the statistics so that each fixed effect is weighted by the 
inverse of its standard error.  The (unreported) result is qualitatively unchanged. 
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In Table 4, we report the results of the persistence test to see if non-causality could be ruled out.  
In the “treatment” test, we see that most of the coefficients are positive and significant, which we 
interpret as persistence of executive quirks over firm transitions.  In the “control” test, most of the 
coefficients are statistically not different from zero, suggesting that causality cannot be ruled out. 
In Table 5, we explore if there are themes in the fixed effects.  Using factor analysis, we find that 
the eigenvalues (variances) of the first two factors are 6.97 and 3.08, contributing 57.8% and 25.5% 
respectively, to the total variance.  This cumulative 83.4% shows that the first two factors practically 
exhaustive the themes in the data.  The chi-squared of an LR (likelihood ratio) test for independence 
is 378, with a p value significant at 0.00%.  The factor loadings for the orthogonal solution can be 
interpreted as how the quirks are weighted for each factor (“theme”) and the correlation between 
the quirks and the factor.  The first factor, which we label as “build,” suggests that there are some 
executives who focus on building out capital, land, and staff, often to the detriment of performance 
on measures like Tobin’s Q, cash flow margin, and return on assets.  With these investments, they 
are able to reduce lead time and shorten the cash conversion cycle.  The second theme is less clear, 
but it seems to be one of a bias against physical capital and toward human capital.  For example, it is 
associated with curtailed investments in PPE and inventory, and the use of rental rather than 
purchased infrastructure.  It is also associated with higher SGA and more employees.  Given that the 
first two themes already explain 83.4% of the variation, the third theme is less important.  We also 
undertake another approach to findings the themes, based on correlations.  The results are 
qualitatively similar, so we do not report them. 
We now report evidence on efficiency implications.  In Table 6, we see that the G index has a 
significant coefficient on almost every executive quirk.  Recall that the “agency” story predicts that 
executive quirks detrimental to performance get reduced by strong governance.  Therefore, it 
predicts that the coefficients on the G index column have the same sign as the correlations of the 
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quirks with Q, an indication of firm value.  This turns out to be true, for 13 of the 19 fixed effects, 
and for all of the 5 significant ones.  The “sorting” story, which predicts that the G index 
coefficients are insignificant, is not supported.  The rightmost two columns produce mixed results.  
Many of the coefficients are not statistically significant, and even those which are do not support the 
“premium” story that executive quirks that are positively correlated with Q are rewarded with 
positive compensation and vice versa.  We interpret these as preliminary evidence that the “agency” 
story seems to fit the data best. 
In Table 7, we report the characteristics of executives who exhibit different types of fixed effects.  
Age shows no particular impact on executive fixed effects, except being associated with smaller 
effects on some aspects of inventory, which drive Q negative.  Therefore, we interpret age to have 
positive effect on the value of the firm through these channels.  The economic significance is large.  
For example, five more years in age is associated with a 0.138 point increase in the payables fixed 
effect, which on the average, is associated with about 5.19 percentage points in payables. 
Tenure in the firm is associated with smaller executive quirks on PPE and inventory, which in 
turn generally drive Q negative.  It is associated with bigger fixed effects on forward rental 
commitments.  The importance of tenure on top of firm fixed effects is consistent with a story of 
complementarity between executive quirks and firm effects (e.g.,: Huckman et al. (forthcoming)). 
The number of outside directorships is generally associated with bigger quirks, such as those for 
number of employees and various aspects of rent.  Again, this is could be explained by different 
theories, although it is certainly consistent with one in which executives learn from outside and 
apply these to the firms in which they work. 
Finally, executives with first degrees in engineering or science and MBA’s tend to have quirks for 
more inventory and shorter lead times.  They are also associated with negative Q and ROA.  In 
unreported regressions of the quirk directly on Q, the coefficients are -0.960, -1.086, and -0.498 for 
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these three groups, all statistically significant at the 1% level, confirming their negative effect on Q. 
In this paper, we simply want to document these, creating a richer fabric for our core message 
that executive quirks are present and can be significant.  We leave further tests to future work. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Many of the additional concerns are pointed out in Bertrand et al. (2003).  For example, how 
representative are transitioning executives in the population of all executives?  We believe this 
representativeness issue is not serious in the context of our message of executive quirks.  First, there 
are 250 such transitioning executives out of the 3,383 in our dataset, so the sample is not small.  
More formally, we conduct a Heckman correction for sample bias, using a selection function based 
on age, tenure, gender, total annual compensation, log of firm assets, firm sales growth, and find that 
there is no qualitative difference in the significance of executive quirks (unreported). 
As Bertrand et al. (2003) noted, there is also a potential problem that outside hires are 
systematically different from internally promoted ones.  We can think of at least two ways to deal 
with this.  The first is to take the executives in our dataset and split them into one group who have 
internal promotions from the other who have not, and compare their quirks.  Tests show that the 
two groups could be drawn from the same distribution.  For instance, the mean quirk on net PPE 
for the first group is -.015 and that for the second is -.023, and the standard deviation is .086 
and .103.  A t-test does not reject the null that they are different.  The second way is to see if the 
identified quirks of our executives change much over time.  Our persistence tests earlier provide 
some assurance that they do not.  Neither of these tests are perfect, since there is still a question of 
whether executives who have never been outside hires are any different. 
Finally, as in Bertrand et al. (2003), we use reported data in firms’ reported accounts.  Although 
most of COMPUSTAT’s data comes from SEC 10-K reports, which are regulatory requirements, 
one cannot rule out some forms of self-reporting biases, such as selective disclosures and choice of 
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accounting conventions. 
We begin this paper by arguing for more research into the people effects in operations 
management.  What might some of these look like?  A clue might be found in the literature of other 
fields.  One of them is that on technology and innovation.  Although scientists and engineers, the 
protagonists in this literature, are quite different from corporate executives, the flavor of the 
research might point out the interesting questions.  For example, there is a cluster of studies around 
what drives their productivity, how they form networks, how they learn and diffuse their learnings.  
These same questions might apply to how, for example, innovations in operations management 
diffuse over time and space.  Another interesting area is to see what might arise from the literature 
on agency effects, and how suitable incentives might alleviate the agency problems that arise from 
quirks. 
We conclude by summarizing that executive quirks exist, are sizable, and seem to fall into 
themes.  They are especially prevalent in weaker governed firms, suggesting that they might be 
negative for firms (but not necessarily for the executives themselves).  They also appear to be 
associated with certain observable characteristics. 
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Table 1 – Summary Statistics 
Panel (a) – Executives 
 
The data is from ExecuComp, Zoominfo, and BoardAnalyst, for 1992 through 2004, in manufacturing, wholesaling, 
and retailing.  We include only those executive-firm-year observations in which the transitioning executive stays at 
least 3 years in the before-firm and after-firm.  Some executives hold different positions (e.g., from COO to CEO) over 
the transition.  Each sub-panel below summarizes observations which have executives in the position.  For brevity, 
we skip the panel for “other executives.” 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 CEO     COO     
Age (yrs) 44 53.0 10.3 -5.0 64.0 15 48.9 6.6 37.0 58.5 
Firm rank 79 1.4 1.1 1.0 6.0 31 3.7 1.2 2.0 6.0 
Male? 102 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.0 49 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.0 
Tenure (yrs) 37 1.2 5.5 -3.5 30.7 13 0.4 3.0 -3.0 9.5 
Salary ($K/yr) 102 586.7 274.9 0.0 1867.2 49 306.2 197.3 133.0 1526.7
Bonus ($K/yr) 102 556.0 598.6 0.0 4122.6 49 216.2 406.9 0.0 2865.7
Other comp ($K/yr) 102 60.3 123.4 0.0 975.7 49 9.6 18.0 0.0 99.7 
Total comp inc options ($K/yr) 102 4090.5 4116.3 191.1 21290.5 49 1390.7 1219.5 201.5 7174.1
Restricted stock grants ($K/yr) 102 437.5 833.2 0.0 4845.2 49 101.3 175.8 0.0 824.1 
Restricted stock held ($K) 102 693.1 1110.8 0.0 4833.9 49 240.7 436.6 0.0 1897.9
Options exercised ($K/yr) 102 448.9 869.5 0.0 5540.4 49 161.8 373.4 0.0 1849.1
Unexer. options ($K) 102 2741.5 4935.7 0.0 38792.5 49 633.9 1287.5 0.0 5689.0
% of company stock held 50 2.2 4.5 0.1 22.9 2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.7 
Salary annual growth 98 65.6 185.0 -70.4 1666.6 46 101.1 201.9 -8.0 936.5 
Total comp annual growth 98 67.9 238.5 -85.5 2244.4 46 111.6 238.6 -20.5 1220.5
Options granted ($K) 102 2530.9 3167.8 43.1 17291.3 49 684.7 731.7 0.0 3208.2
Years to retirement 102 4.6 8.5 0.0 35.0 49 4.3 6.9 0.0 30.0 
Executive director? 102 0.8 0.3 0.0 1.0 49 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 
 CFO     Ops Execs   
Age (yrs) 17 54.7 6.7 39.8 67.5 4 49.6 3.4 46.5 53.0 
Firm rank 48 2.4 1.1 1.0 6.0 12 3.1 0.9 2.0 4.0 
Male? 95 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 26 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Tenure (yrs) 10 -0.3 3.3 -5.0 6.5 2 -2.8 2.5 -4.5 -1.0 
Salary ($K/yr) 95 392.1 151.7 135.8 820.9 26 256.0 99.8 98.8 504.4 
Bonus ($K/yr) 95 309.8 283.2 0.0 1625.0 26 111.1 138.8 0.0 658.3 
Other comp ($K/yr) 95 31.3 78.9 0.0 562.9 26 20.8 45.5 0.0 200.8 
Total comp inc options ($K/yr) 93 2419.4 2326.4 376.8 15165.3 26 1072.2 921.3 160.4 4965.9
Restricted stock grants ($K/yr) 95 224.2 371.1 0.0 1736.9 26 107.1 381.5 0.0 1958.4
Restricted stock held ($K) 95 572.5 1084.3 0.0 6724.8 26 299.9 1206.0 0.0 6197.3
Options exercised ($K/yr) 95 417.0 1006.4 0.0 6371.0 26 58.3 94.6 0.0 340.5 
Unexer. options ($K) 95 1956.2 10664.6 0.0 103323.9 26 370.1 716.8 0.0 3311.3
% of company stock held 3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0     
Salary annual growth 86 106.1 253.3 -19.1 1775.0 25 149.1 519.1 -6.1 2627.5
Total comp annual growth 86 131.3 401.7 -38.6 2790.7 25 61.1 98.3 -14.9 407.0 
Options granted ($K) 94 1399.9 2481.5 0.0 22697.1 26 447.9 531.6 0.0 2144.4
Years to retirement 95 3.6 8.6 0.0 39.0 26 1.3 5.9 0.0 30.0 
Executive director? 95 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 26 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 
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Panel (b) – Executive Transitions 
 
The top figure in each cell is the number of executives who transitioned from the position in the specified row to that 
in the specified column.  The percentage is the portion of executives in the cell who makes the transition across firms 
with different 2-digit SIC codes. 
  TO      
  CEO COO CFO Ops execs Others Total 
FROM 
CEO 
27 
(51.9%) 
12 
(58.3%) 
2 
(100.0%) 
0 
(-) 
14 
(35.7%) 
20 
(68%) 
 
COO 
14 
(71.4%) 
24 
(58.3%) 
3 
(66.7%) 
2 
(100.0%) 
14 
(57.1%) 
28 
(75%) 
 
CFO 
2 
(50.0%) 
2 
(0.0%) 
31 
(41.9%) 
0 
(-) 
5 
(80.0%) 
14 
(21%) 
 
Ops execs 
3 
(33.3%) 
2 
(50.0%) 
0 
(-) 
4 
(50.0%) 
9 
(33.3%) 
5 
(40%) 
 
Others 
21 
(61.9%) 
17 
(64.7%) 
3 
(33.3%) 
6 
(33.3%) 
33 
(72.7%) 
30 
(59%) 
 
Total 
67 
(58.2%) 
57 
(57.9%) 
39 
(46.2%) 
12 
(50.0%) 
75 
(58.7%) 
97 
(58%) 
 
Panel (c) – Firm Characteristics 
 
The data is from the merged CRSP-COMPUSTAT tapes.  Firm-year observations are included only if there is at least 
one executive transition (observed in panel (a)) associated with the firm over at least 3 years. 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 1951 1997.6 3.3 1992.0 2004.0 
Q 1088 8186.2 23662.4 2.1 290444.0 
Market cap ($ bil) 1002 1.9 1.3 0.6 9.9 
Sales ($ mil) 1088 7108.4 11122.6 0.0 89051.0 
Assets ($ mil) 1088 6219.3 12413.5 19.2 123684.0 
Capex ($ mil) 1071 304.2 526.9 0.1 4131.0 
SGA ($ mil) 1046 1697.6 3039.5 0.0 24523.0 
Ad ($ mil) 503 371.6 634.1 0.0 3724.0 
ROA 1088 0.0 0.1 -1.2 0.4 
Write downs ($ mil) 57 -75.5 200.3 -979.0 0.0 
Capacity and Growth      
PPE net ($ mil) 1088 1857.2 3021.4 0.2 18894.0 
PPE land ($ mil) 916 126.2 244.9 0.0 3559.0 
PPE bldgs ($ mil) 916 785.9 1335.1 0.0 11290.0 
PPE machinery ($ mil) 952 1725.1 2695.1 0.6 19566.0 
PPE leases ($ mil) 814 205.6 579.0 0.0 4782.0 
PPE construction ($ mil) 1016 147.4 324.4 0.0 2486.0 
Employees (‘000) 1086 35.1 58.2 0.0 675.0 
Rent ($ mil) 998 114.8 174.8 0.0 825.0 
Rent commitment 1 year ($ mil) 961 93.6 154.8 0.1 782.0 
Rent commitment 5 years ($ mil) 944 393.7 672.2 0.0 3373.0 
Line Balancing      
Lead time (days) 1083 54.4 130.2 1.6 2278.8 
Back log ($ mil) 431 34.6 149.3 0.0 1099.0 
Inventory, total ($ mil) 1088 872.1 1542.9 0.0 15989.0 
Inventory, raw materials ($ mil) 465 370.1 1009.9 0.0 5997.0 
Inventory, WIP ($ mil) 420 79.5 248.2 0.0 2496.0 
Inventory, finished goods ($ mil) 486 385.0 638.0 0.0 4228.0 
Cash Conversion Cycle      
Receivables ($ mil) 1084 715.4 1982.0 0.0 31622.0 
Payables ($ mil) 1088 500.7 854.1 0.3 7485.0 
Operating cash flow ($ mil) 1046 158.8 279.3 -66.0 3627.0 
Cash flow margin (%) 1051 0.0 4.2 -79.8 80.6 
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Table 2 – Executive Fixed Effects 
The column headers are respectively, the adjusted R-squared, F statistic of a joint test of the executive fixed 
effects, p-value of the test, number of constraints in the joint test, and number of observations.  The row 
headers are the different types of executives as defined in the text.  The baseline specification is: 
OP_PARAMETEReft = CEOeft + COOeft + CFOeft + OPSeft + OTHERSeft + 
YEARt + FIRMf + Xeft.βeft + εeft , 
where CEO, COO, CFO, OPS, and OTHERS are the fixed effects for executive, YEARt for year, and FIRMf, 
firm.  X is a set of controls by firm and time, and ε the disturbance term for executive e in firm f and year t. .  
Unless otherwise stated, X includes log sales (for growth), log assets (for size), log cash flow (for financial 
constraint).  Estimations are done with fixed effects, clustered around the firm level. 
In the tables below, we report coefficients for the CEO, COO, operations executives, and “all,” which 
includes these and the CFO and “others.”  ***  = significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
Panel (a) – Capacity and Growth 
 
Rental expense is scaled by sales, rental commitments by rental expense, and others by assets.  “Rent in 1 
yr” and “Rent in 5 yrs” mean rental commitments 1 and 5 years ahead, and “PPE constr” is property, plant 
and equipment under construction.  The COMPUSTAT item numbers for PPE are data8, data260, data263, 
data264, data265, and data266; employees is data29, rent data47, and rental commitments data95 and 
data96. 
 
 PPE 
(net) 
 PPE 
land 
 PPE 
bldgs 
 PPE 
mach 
 PPE 
leases 
 PPE 
constr 
 
 R2 p R2 p R2 p R2 p R2 p R2 p 
 .89  .94  .89  .92  .90  .72  
CEO .89 .65 .94 .63 .88 1.00 .91 1.00 .90 .36 .71 1.00 
COO .89 .71 .94 .00*** .89 .74 .91 1.00 .90 .99 .71 1.00 
Ops .89 .99 .94 .05* .89 .00*** .92 .77 .91 .00*** .72 .98 
All .90 .00*** .95 .00*** .91 .00*** .93 .00*** .90 .83 .71 .96 
 Emp  Rent  Rent 
1 yr 
 Rent 
5 yrs 
     
 .95  .96  .58  .66      
CEO .95 .87 .96 .72 .72 .00*** .80 .00***     
COO .95 .69 .97 .00*** .56 1.00 .64 1.00     
Ops .95 .43 .96 .00*** .57 1.00 .65 1.00     
All .96 .00*** .97 .00*** .71 .00*** .78 .00***     
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Panel (b) – Line Balancing 
 
All dependent variables are in log form.  Backlog is the backlog of orders.   “Invent r. mat” is raw materials.  
Lead time in days is measured as in Netessine and Roumiantsev (2005), as the log of a multiple: payables 
(COMPUSTAT item data70) times 365 divided by cost of goods sold (item 41).  Order backlog (item data98) 
is scaled by sales (data12).  The inventory variables, in log form, include those for total, raw materials, work 
in progress, and finished goods.  Regressions using inventory variables as dependent variables have the 
following as control variables: log of cost of goods sold, log gross margin, log lead time, log sigma sales, 
sales growth, log of the one-month T-bill rate, and an indicator variable for sales surprise.  Sigma sales is a 
proxy for demand uncertainty, and is calculated by first regressing sales on five trend terms (t to t5) and 
taking the root-mean-squared error of the regressions.  The sales surprise indicator is 1 if sales surprise, 
defined as the median of the First Call analyst forecasts for sales at the fiscal year end date, is greater than 
the actual announced sales; it is 0 otherwise. 
 
 Lead 
time 
 Back 
log 
 Invent 
total  
Invent 
r mat  
Invent 
WIP  
Invent 
goods  
 R2 p R2 p R2 p R2 p R2 p R2 p 
 .79  .97  .39  .06  .26  .02  
CEO .81 .00*** .99 .00*** .41 .04** .11 .03** .21 .93 .02 .95 
COO .79 .30   .36 .33 .07 .89 .23 .60 .02 1.00 
Ops .79 .22   .39 .94       
All .81 .00*** .99 .00*** .35 .00*** .07 .07* .24 .96 .06 1.00 
 
Panel (c) – Cash Conversion Cycle 
 
Receivables (rec, COMPUSTAT item 2) and payables (pay, COMPUSTAT item 70) are in log form.  
Operating cash flow is defined as sales less SGA plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by market 
value of assets, defined as market capitalization plus carrying value of preferred stock, long-term debt, and 
debt in current liabilities. 
 
 Rec  Pay  Op CF  ΔCOGS  
 R2 p R2 p R2 p R2 p 
 .95  .96  .69  .11  
CEO .95 .02** .96 .00*** .69 .942 .18 .00*** 
COO .95 .91 .96 .34 .69 .997 .06 1.00 
Ops .95 .00*** .96 .11 .69 .603 .10 1.00 
All .96 .00*** .97 .00*** .69 .812 .09 .69 
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Table 3 – Size Distribution of Executive Fixed Effects 
InterQ is the inter-quartile range of the effects, to be compared with μ(DV), the mean of the dependent 
variables (e.g., PPE net in the first sub-panel). 
 
Panel (a)  – Capacity and Growth 
 
 PPE 
net 
  PPE 
land 
  PPE 
bldgs 
  PPE 
mach 
  
 Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) 
CEO .002 .029 .333 .001 .002 .028 .001 .019 .145 .001 .024 .367 
COO .000 .035 .333 -.004 .003 .028 -.010 .018 .145 .006 .038 .367 
CFO -.012 .035 .333 .000 .004 .028 -.011 .028 .145 -.038 .059 .367 
Ops  -.006 .022 .333 .002 .015 .028 .008 .070 .145 .040 .065 .367 
 PPE 
leases   
PPE 
constr   Emp   Rent   
CEO -.005 .007 .062 -.001 .003 .020 .000 .001 .333 .000 .003 .060 
COO -.001 .007 .062 .001 .006 .020 .001 .001 .333 .003 .002 .060 
CFO .002 .014 .062 -.001 .005 .020 -.001 .002 .333 .000 .002 .060 
Ops  .027 .006 .062 .000 .007 .020 .001 .002 .333 -.002 .015 .060 
 Rent 1 
yr   
Rent 5 
yrs   
      
CEO -.122 .045 .852 -.574 .291 3.305       
COO .003 .117 .852 .015 .396 3.305       
CFO -.006 .048 .852 .010 .356 3.305       
Ops  .020 .083 .852 .163 .325 3.305       
 
Panel (b) – Line Balancing 
 
 Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) 
 Lead 
time 
  Back 
log 
  Invent 
total 
  Invent 
r mat 
  
CEO -.070 .141 3.66 .374 .553 4.58 -.018 .147 1.71 -.081 .160 2.71 
COO .063 .122 3.66   4.58 -.016 .151 1.71 .075 .150 2.71 
CFO .044 .087 3.66   4.58 .013 .234 1.71 .135 .211 2.71 
Ops  -.168 .057 3.66   4.58 .028 .054 1.71   2.71 
 Invent 
WIP 
  Invent 
goods 
        
CEO -.045 .477 3.67 -.097 .227 2.28       
COO -.290 .448 3.67 -.032 .168 2.28       
CFO .037 .190 3.67 -.074 .148 2.28       
Ops    3.67   2.28       
  
Panel (c) – Cash Conversion Cycle 
 
 Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) Mean InterQ μ(DV) 
 Rec   Pay   Op CF   Δ 
COGS 
  
CEO -.006 .132 5.24 -.029 .170 5.19 2.208 9.922 158. .063 .082 .088 
COO -.027 .203 5.24 .043 .174 5.19 1.976 15.132 158. -.024 .075 .088 
CFO .074 .253 5.24 .033 .166 5.19 -32.59 40.216 158. .012 .091 .088 
Ops  -.179 .371 5.24 -.138 .133 5.19 56.390 85.569 158. -.055 .146 .088 
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Table 4 – Persistence of Executive Fixed Effects 
In the “treatment” test, we regress the after-firm effects on the before-firm effects.  The figures are estimated 
coefficients of the before-firm effect, with standard errors in brackets.  In the “control” test, we regress the 
after-firm effects (estimated using the control 3-year shifted transition) on the before-firm effects.  
Specifically, the “treatment” tests use actual data, while the “control” tests run the same estimations using 
executive transitions 3 years ahead of their actual transitions.  In both cases, we first create firm-year 
residuals by regressing our operational decision variables on firm and year fixed effects, and time-varying 
firm controls.  These residuals are collapsed by executive-firm periods, by taking either the median of the 
residuals.  The executive fixed effects are then estimated using these residuals. 
*** = significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
 Treatment Control 
Capacity and Growth   
PPE net 0.68 (.19) 0.24 (.23) 
PPE land 0.96 (.04)** 0.20 (.15) 
PPE bldgs 0.95 (.06)* 0.63 (.14) 
PPE machinery 0.82 (.13) 0.34 (.22) 
PPE leases 0.98 (.02)** 0.88 (.13) 
PPE construction 0.90 (.06)* 0.62 (.22) 
Employees 0.86 (.11) 0.44 (.20) 
Rent 0.98 (.03)** 0.60 (.24) 
Rent commitment 1 year 0.58 (.24) 0.82 (.13) 
Rent commitment 5 years 0.89 (.07)* 0.72 (.13) 
Line Balancing   
Lead time 0.84 (.10) 0.54 (.15) 
Back log 1.00 (.00)*** 0.00 (.00)*** 
Inventory, total 0.90 (.07)* 0.71 (.18) 
Inventory, raw materials 1.00 (.00)*** 0.95 (.06)* 
Inventory, WIP 0.93 (.09)* 0.94 (.08)* 
Inventory, finished goods 0.71 (.24) 0.37 (.28) 
Cash Conversion Cycle   
Receivables 0.76 (.20) 0.48 (.32) 
Payables 0.94 (.03)** 0.66 (.17) 
Operating cash flow 0.15 (.18) 0.71 (.18) 
Change in COGS 0.51 (.25) 0.60 (.22) 
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Table 5 – Themes Among Executive Fixed Effects 
The factor loadings for the orthogonal solution are shown in the middle 3 columns.  Loadings 0.5 or more in 
absolute value are in bold.  Uniqueness is the proportion of the common variance of the variable not 
associated with the factors.  A uniqueness is equal to 1 means complete communality. 
 
 Factor1 
“Build” 
Factor2 
“People” 
Factor3 
“?” 
Uniqueness 
Q -.74 .06 .20 .40 
Capex .79 .06 .18 .34 
SGA -.46 .58 .07 .45 
Ad -.34 -.10 -.04 .87 
Cash flow margin on sales -.46 .06 .49 .55 
ROA -.55 -.06 .56 .38 
Capacity and Growth     
PPE net .63 -.33 .49 .25 
PPE land .51 .04 .24 .68 
PPE bldgs .20 .05 .13 .94 
PPE machinery .14 -.60 .43 .44 
PPE leases .27 .56 .19 .58 
PPE construction .46 -.40 -.07 .63 
Employees .51 .63 .25 .28 
Rent .47 .50 .13 .51 
Rent commitment 1 year -.01 .37 -.28 .79 
Rent commitment 5 years .06 .50 -.22 .70 
Line Balancing     
Lead time -.64 .04 -.02 .59 
Back log -.13 .24 -.05 .92 
Inventory, total .35 -.24 -.16 .79 
Inventory, raw materials .31 -.18 -.06 .87 
Inventory, WIP .37 -.25 .02 .80 
Inventory, finished goods .17 -.08 -.17 .93 
Cash Conversion Cycle     
Receivables -.65 -.40 -.16 .39 
Payables -.43 .31 -.20 .67 
Operating cash flow .04 .14 -.30 .89 
Change in COGS -.33 .18 -.13 .84 
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Table 6 – Executive Fixed Effects and Governance, Compensation 
Tobin’s Q is calculated total assets plus market cap less common equity and deferred taxes, divided by total 
assets.  Correlation with Q is obtained by first regressing the operations decision variables on the set of firm 
and year fixed effects as well as time-varying firm effects.  In the second stage, we regress the residuals 
from these regressions on executive fixed effects, without a constant.  In the third stage, we estimate the 
correlations between the predicted values of Q and executive fixed effects from the second stage 
regressions, using GLS (generalized least squares) with the known standard errors of the first stage as 
weights. 
Coefficients in the second column, “G index,” are obtained by regressing executive fixed effects obtained 
from Table 2 on the G index, obtained from  I/B/E/S and created by Gompers, et al. (2003).  The rightmost 
two columns are obtained as follows.  First, regress the log of total compensation and log salary on firm and 
year fixed effects and time-varying firm controls: lagged log assets, lagged log sales.  ROA, the G index, 
tenure of the executive in the firm, and indicator variables for the position of the executive (CEO, CFO, etc.) .  
We then regress the compensation residuals from the first-stage estimations on the executive fixed effects.  
We use GLS weights as before to minimize measurement error.   *** = significant at 1%. 
 
 Corr with Q G index Total 
compensation 
Salary 
compensation 
Capacity and Growth     
PPE net -0.047 -.0014*** .0432 .0215 
PPE land -0.008 -.0011*** .7709 .3512 
PPE bldgs -0.015 -.0036*** .1075 .0881 
PPE machinery 0.015*** .0049*** .0261 .0208* 
PPE leases -0.002 .0008*** -.0105 -.0436 
PPE construction -0.01 -.0004*** .4591 -.0014 
Employees -0.002 -.0002*** .1946 .1776 
Rent -0.012 .0003*** -.0031 .0886 
Rent commitment 1 year 0.005 .0051*** -.0178 -.0074* 
Rent commitment 5 years -0.026 .03086** -.00374** -.00094** 
Line Balancing     
Lead time 0.364*** .0309*** -.0041* -.0063** 
Back log 0.039*** .0045*** -.0401* -.0147** 
Inventory, total -0.16 -.0114*** .0225* .0099** 
Inventory, raw materials -0.164 .0051*** -.0148* -.0223* 
Inventory, WIP -0.239 -.0239*** .0307** .0403** 
Inventory, finished goods -0.094 .0014*** .0114* .0033** 
Cash Conversion Cycle     
Receivables 0.49*** .0461** .0013* -.0084** 
Payables 0.204*** .0003*** -.0046* -.0066** 
Operating cash flow -46.3 -5.8372 .0000*** .0000*** 
Change in COGS 1.32 -.0004*** .0015 -.0022* 
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Table 7 – Executive Fixed Effects and Executive Characteristics 
We use the following specification: 
EXEC_FEeft = f(AGEet , TENUREeft , 
    NUM_DIRECTORSHIPSeft , BBusiness?e, BEng?e, BSc?e, MBA?e ) 
 
where AGEet is the age of the executive at year t, TENUREeft the executive’s years with firm f at year t, NUM_DIRECTORSHIPSeft the executive’s number of 
directorships outside firm f in year t, BBusiness?e an indicator for whether the executive has a bachelor’s degree in business, BEng?e for a bachelor’s degree in 
engineering, BSc?e for a degree in science, and MBA?e  if the executive has an MBA.  The bachelor’s degree in the arts is used as a baseline.  Correlation with Q 
is taken from panel (b) of Table 6.  These regressions are clustered at the firm level.  *** = significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
   Observable executive characteristics     
 Corr Mean of    Num. of Bachelors’ (base=BA)   
 with Q variable Age Tenure directorships Bus. Eng. Sc. MBA? 
Capacity and Growth          
PPE net -0.047 .33 -0.007 -0.087** -0.001 0.011** 0.039 -0.03 -0.04 
PPE land -0.008 .03 -0.001 -0.007* 0 0.001** 0.009* 0.003 0.007* 
PPE bldgs -0.015 .15 0.013 -0.054* -0.002 0.003 0.033 0 0.005 
PPE machinery 0.015*** .37 -0.003 -0.102* -0.002 0.007 -0.024 -0.107** -0.118** 
PPE leases -0.002 .06 -0.003 0.006 0.002** 0.001 0.012 -0.014* -0.051*** 
PPE construction -0.01 .02 -0.003 -0.013** 0 0.001** 0.011* 0.006 0.010** 
Employees -0.002 .01 0 0.001 0.000** 0.000* 0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** 
Rent -0.012 .06 -0.001 -0.001 0.002** 0.001* 0.014*** 0.005 -0.007* 
Rent commitment 1 year 0.005 .85 0.039 0.085* 0.011** -0.004 -0.154** 0.061 -0.021 
Rent commitment 5 years -0.026 3.31 0.092 0.620** 0.064** 0.022 -0.655* -0.033 -0.754*** 
Line Balancing          
Lead time 0.364*** 3.66 0.041 0.665*** -0.016** -0.01 -0.537*** -0.400*** -0.302** 
Back log 0.039*** 4.58 - - - - - - - 
Inventory, total -0.16 1.72 -0.142** -0.472*** -0.016** 0.01 0.495*** 0.304** 0.617*** 
Inventory, raw materials -0.164 2.71 -0.043 -0.590*** 0 -0.001 0.476*** 0.460*** 0.419*** 
Inventory, WIP -0.239 3.68 -0.159** -0.763*** -0.009 0.005 0.939*** 0.500*** 0.390*** 
Inventory, finished goods -0.094 2.29 -0.011 -0.445*** 0.001 0.004 0.423*** 0.418*** 0.613*** 
Cash Conversion Cycle          
Receivables 0.49*** 5.24 0.081 -0.094 -0.037** -0.061** -0.328 0.127 0.464*** 
Payables 0.204*** 5.19 0.138* -0.025 -0.002 -0.037* -0.371* 0.042 0.22 
Operating cash flow -46.3 .06 -18.974 2.032 -0.538 0.773 23.568 21.217 98.814** 
Change in COGS 1.32 .08 -0.007** -0.000 -0.001 -0.005 -0.014 0.065 -0.069** 
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The following tables are not meant to be included in the paper proper, but are 
details for reference by referees.  The numbering of the tables following those 
in the paper, with an “a” suffix. 
Table 8a – Executive Fixed Effects 
Panel (a) – Capacity and Growth 
 
 R2 F P #c N R2 F P #c N 
 PPE 
(net) 
    PPE 
land 
    
 .89     .94     
CEO .89 .91 .65 51 836 .94 .92 .63 44 705 
COO .89 .86 .71 42 836 .94 2.08 .00*** 36 705 
CFO .89 1.37 .09* 30 836 .94 2.25 .00*** 28 705 
Ops execs .89 .21 .99 8 836 .94 2.10 .05* 6 705 
Other execs .90 2.50 .00*** 49 836 .94 2.07 .00*** 40 705 
COO, ops execs .89 .76 .89 50 836 .94 2.13 .00*** 42 705 
All .90 1.59 .00*** 137 836 .95 2.03 .00*** 119 705 
 PPE 
bldgs 
    PPE 
mach 
    
 .89     .92     
CEO .88 .41 1.00 44 705 .91 .52 1.00 43 726 
COO .89 .83 .74 36 705 .91 .34 1.00 37 726 
CFO .89 1.67 .02** 28 705 .92 2.32 .00*** 28 726 
Ops execs .89 3.83 .00*** 6 705 .92 .51 .77 5 726 
Other execs .91 4.02 .00*** 40 705 .93 4.10 .00*** 41 726 
COO, ops execs .89 1.28 .12 42 705 .91 .36 1.00 42 726 
All .91 2.31 .00*** 119 705 .93 1.88 .00*** 116 726 
 PPE 
leases     
PPE 
constr     
 .90     .72     
CEO .90 1.07 .36 38 605 .71 .35 1.00 48 780 
COO .90 .49 .99 30 605 .71 .26 1.00 41 780 
CFO .90 1.31 .15 23 605 .73 1.30 .14 30 780 
Ops execs .91 4.57 .00*** 8 605 .72 .25 .98 8 780 
Other execs .90 .57 .99 40 605 .72 .91 .63 43 780 
COO, ops execs .90 1.32 .10 38 605 .71 .25 1.00 49 780 
All .90 .86 .83 104 605 .71 .78 .96 131 780 
 Emp     Rent     
 .95     .96     
CEO .95 .78 .87 51 834 .96 .87 .72 49 767 
COO .95 .88 .69 42 834 .97 3.96 .00*** 42 767 
CFO .95 2.51 .00*** 30 834 .96 .40 1.00 28 767 
Ops execs .95 1.00 .43 8 834 .96 8.38 .00*** 8 767 
Other execs .96 4.71 .00*** 49 834 .97 4.13 .00*** 47 767 
COO, ops execs .95 .89 .69 50 834 .97 5.43 .00*** 50 767 
All .96 2.64 .00*** 137 834 .97 2.41 .00*** 131 767 
 Rent 1 
yr     
Rent 5 
yrs     
 .58     .66     
CEO .72 7.47 .00*** 45 711 .80 9.82 .00*** 44 703 
COO .56 .20 1.00 35 711 .64 .12 1.00 34 703 
CFO .57 .32 1.00 26 711 .64 .29 1.00 26 703 
Ops execs .57 .04 1.00 8 711 .65 .12 1.00 8 703 
Other execs .74 8.69 .00*** 45 711 .80 9.84 .00*** 46 703 
COO, ops execs .55 .17 1.00 43 711 .63 .11 1.00 42 703 
All .71 3.22 .00*** 115 711 .78 3.74 .00*** 114 703 
 
 B
Panel (b) – Line Balancing 
 
 R2 F P #c N R2 F P #c N 
 Lead 
time 
    Back 
log 
    
 .79     .97     
CEO .81 2.24 .00*** 53 900 .99 8.44 .00*** 3 54 
COO .79 1.10 .30 49 900      
CFO .78 .24 1.00 30 900      
Ops execs .79 1.32 .22 9 900      
Other execs .81 2.89 .00*** 50 900 .99 7.44 .00*** 4 54 
COO, ops execs .79 1.14 .23 58 900      
All .81 1.62 .00*** 148 900 .99 7.44 .00*** 4 54 
 Invent 
total     
Invent 
r mat     
 .39     .06     
CEO .41 1.41 .04** 49 841 .11 1.70 .03** 22 299 
COO .36 1.08 .33 44 841 .07 .57 .89 15 299 
CFO .36 1.62 .03** 27 841 .06 1.98 .03** 12 299 
Ops execs .39 .36 .94 8 841      
Other execs .41 1.82 .00*** 47 841 .09 .89 .60 19 299 
COO, ops execs .37 .97 .53 52 841 .07 .57 .89 15 299 
All .35 1.60 .00*** 136 841 .07 1.36 .07* 50 299 
 Invent 
WIP     
Invent 
goods     
 .26     .02     
CEO .21 .48 .93 13 193 .02 .57 .95 23 335 
COO .23 .83 .60 10 193 .02 .09 1.00 12 335 
CFO .26 .78 .64 9 193 .02 .16 1.00 12 335 
Ops execs           
Other execs .26 .42 .97 15 193 .06 .40 .99 18 335 
COO, ops execs .23 .83 .60 10 193 .02 .09 1.00 12 335 
All .24 .57 .96 31 193 .06 .38 1.00 48 335 
 
Panel (c) – Cash Conversion Cycle 
 
 R2 F P #c N R2 F P #c N 
 Rec     Pay     
 .95     .96     
CEO .95 1.48 .02** 51 848 .96 1.80 .00*** 53 900 
COO .95 .72 .91 43 848 .96 1.07 .34 49 900 
CFO .95 1.29 .14 29 848 .96 1.00 .46 30 900 
Ops execs .95 5.61 .00*** 9 848 .96 1.62 .11 9 900 
Other execs .95 1.55 .01** 47 848 .96 2.97 .00*** 50 900 
COO, ops execs .95 1.57 .01*** 52 848 .96 1.16 .20 58 900 
All .96 1.44 .00*** 139 848 .97 2.02 .00*** 148 900 
 Op 
CF     
Δ 
COGS     
 .69     .11     
CEO .69 0.70 .942 51 832 .18 2.26 .00*** 51 836 
COO .69 0.50 .997 42 832 .06 .15 1.00 42 836 
CFO .70 1.72 .010 30 832 .08 .33 1.00 30 836 
Ops execs .69 0.80 .603 8 832 .10 .12 1.00 8 836 
Other execs .69 0.84 .778 49 832 .19 2.50 .00*** 49 836 
COO, ops execs .68 0.54 .996 50 832 .05 .14 1.00 50 836 
All .69 0.88 .812 137 832 .09 .93 .69 137 836 
 
 
 C
Table 9a – Size Distribution of Executive Fixed Effects 
The first two column headers in each sub-panel are the mean and standard deviation of these effects.  
ΔSD(DV) is the change in the standard deviation of the dependent variable with one standard deviation 
change in executive fixed effects.  InterQ is the inter-quartile range of the effects, to be compared with μ(DV), 
the mean of the dependent variables (e.g., PPE net in the first sub-panel). 
 
Panel (a)  – Capacity and Growth 
 
Rental expense is scaled by sales, rental commitments by rental expense, and others by assets.  “Rent in 1 
yr” and “Rent in 5 yrs” mean rental commitments 1 and 5 years ahead, and “PPE constr” is property, plant 
and equipment under construction.  The COMPUSTAT item numbers for PPE are data8, data260, data263, 
data264, data265, and data266; employees is data29, rent data47, and rental commitments data95 and 
data96. 
 Mean SD ΔSD(DV) InterQ μ(DV) Mean SD ΔSD(DV) InterQ μ(DV) 
 PPE 
net 
    PPE 
land 
    
CEO .002 .046 .001 .029 .333 .001 .010 .000 .002 .028 
COO .000 .045 .000 .035 .333 -.004 .014 -.001 .003 .028 
CFO -.012 .055 -.004 .035 .333 .000 .013 .000 .004 .028 
Ops  -.006 .023 -.001 .022 .333 .002 .011 .001 .015 .028 
Other  .007 .084 .004 .068 .333 -.002 .014 -.001 .007 .028 
COO, ops  -.001 .042 .000 .038 .333 -.003 .014 -.001 .004 .028 
All -.016 .087 -.008 .069 .333 .000 .014 .000 .009 .028 
 PPE 
bldgs 
    PPE 
mach 
    
CEO .001 .026 .000 .019 .145 .001 .043 .000 .024 .367 
COO -.010 .035 -.003 .018 .145 .006 .034 .001 .038 .367 
CFO -.011 .051 -.004 .028 .145 -.038 .082 -.012 .059 .367 
Ops  .008 .068 .004 .070 .145 .040 .049 .007 .065 .367 
Other  .010 .090 .007 .044 .145 .021 .117 .009 .106 .367 
COO, ops  -.008 .041 -.002 .020 .145 .010 .037 .001 .036 .367 
All -.031 .117 -.027 .063 .145 -.002 .096 -.001 .083 .367 
 PPE 
leases     
PPE 
constr     
CEO -.005 .037 -.001 .007 .062 -.001 .006 .000 .003 .020 
COO -.001 .024 .000 .007 .062 .001 .005 .000 .006 .020 
CFO .002 .023 .000 .014 .062 -.001 .012 -.001 .005 .020 
Ops  .027 .076 .022 .006 .062 .000 .007 .000 .007 .020 
Other  -.002 .019 .000 .011 .062 .002 .013 .001 .009 .020 
COO, ops  .005 .040 .002 .006 .062 .001 .006 .000 .006 .020 
All -.004 .037 -.001 .013 .062 -.003 .020 -.002 .011 .020 
 Emp     Rent     
CEO .000 .002 .000 .001 .333 .000 .007 .000 .003 .060 
COO .001 .002 .000 .001 .333 .003 .015 .000 .002 .060 
CFO -.001 .003 .000 .002 .333 .000 .004 .000 .002 .060 
Ops  .001 .002 .000 .002 .333 -.002 .019 .000 .015 .060 
Other  .000 .004 .000 .002 .333 -.002 .015 .000 .004 .060 
COO, ops  .001 .002 .000 .001 .333 .002 .016 .000 .003 .060 
All .001 .004 .000 .003 .333 .003 .011 .000 .006 .060 
 Rent 1 
yr     
Rent 5 
yrs     
CEO -.122 .917 -.678 .045 .852 -.574 4.104 -14.268 .291 3.305 
COO .003 .151 .001 .117 .852 .015 .517 .003 .396 3.305 
CFO -.006 .154 -.002 .048 .852 .010 .585 .003 .356 3.305 
Ops  .020 .058 .002 .083 .852 .163 .521 .037 .325 3.305 
Other  .154 .925 .290 .131 .852 .630 4.029 1.121 .527 3.305 
COO, ops  .006 .137 .002 .103 .852 .043 .502 .010 .397 3.305 
All .045 .608 .055 .166 .852 -.137 2.633 -.160 .535 3.305 
 D
Panel (b) – Line Balancing 
 
All dependent variables are in log form.  Backlog is the backlog of orders.   “Invent r. mat” is raw materials.  
Lead time in days is measured as in Netessine and Roumiantsev (2005), as the log of a multiple: payables 
(COMPUSTAT item data70) times 365 divided by cost of goods sold (item 41).  Order backlog (item data98) 
is scaled by sales (data12).  The inventory variables, in log form, include those for total, raw materials, work 
in progress, and finished goods. 
 
 Mean SD ΔSD(DV) InterQ μ(DV) Mean SD ΔSD(DV) InterQ μ(DV) 
 Lead 
time 
    Back 
log 
    
CEO -.070 .345 -.146 .141 3.66 .374 .585 1.324 .553 4.58 
COO .063 .270 .025 .122 3.66     4.58 
CFO .044 .097 .006 .087 3.66     4.58 
Ops  -.168 .386 -.096 .057 3.66     4.58 
Other  -.054 .409 -.033 .219 3.66 -.361 .502 -.128 .541 4.58 
COO, ops  .028 .297 .013 .118 3.66     4.58 
All .093 .460 .064 .300 3.66 .433 .464 .142 .328 4.58 
 Invent 
total 
    Invent 
r mat 
    
CEO -.018 .184 -.020 .147 1.71 -.081 .226 -.111 .160 2.71 
COO -.016 .194 -.004 .151 1.71 .075 .164 .016 .150 2.71 
CFO .013 .213 .003 .234 1.71 .135 .389 .070 .211 2.71 
Ops  .028 .134 .004 .054 1.71     2.71 
Other  .001 .241 .000 .193 1.71 .024 .240 .008 .313 2.71 
COO, ops  -.011 .187 -.002 .141 1.71 .075 .164 .016 .150 2.71 
All -.037 .325 -.014 .239 1.71 -.175 .510 -.119 .548 2.71 
 Invent 
WIP 
    Invent 
goods 
    
CEO -.045 .314 -.086 .477 3.67 -.097 .397 -.233 .227 2.28 
COO -.290 .436 -.083 .448 3.67 -.032 .186 -.005 .168 2.28 
CFO .037 .496 .012 .190 3.67 -.074 .346 -.021 .148 2.28 
Ops      3.67     2.28 
Other  .238 .225 .035 .342 3.67 .146 .414 .048 .163 2.28 
COO, ops  -.290 .436 -.083 .448 3.67 -.032 .186 -.005 .168 2.28 
All .185 .691 .084 .641 3.67 -.049 .437 -.017 .188 2.28 
 
 
  
 
 E
 
Panel (c) – Cash Conversion Cycle 
 
Receivables (rec, COMPUSTAT item 2) and payables (pay, COMPUSTAT item 70) are in log form.  
Operating cash flow is defined as sales less SGA plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by market 
value of assets, defined as market capitalization plus carrying value of preferred stock, long-term debt, and 
debt in current liabilities. 
 
 Mean SD ΔSD(DV) InterQ μ(DV) Mean SD ΔSD(DV) InterQ μ(DV) 
 Rec     Pay     
CEO -.006 .471 -.016 .132 5.24 -.029 .319 -.057 .170 5.19 
COO -.027 .366 -.005 .203 5.24 .043 .250 .006 .174 5.19 
CFO .074 .314 .012 .253 5.24 .033 .205 .004 .166 5.19 
Ops  -.179 1.050 -.098 .371 5.24 -.138 .396 -.033 .133 5.19 
Other  .061 .461 .015 .259 5.24 -.069 .396 -.016 .292 5.19 
COO, ops  -.047 .526 -.013 .223 5.24 .016 .281 .003 .170 5.19 
All -.012 .539 -.003 .328 5.24 .125 .499 .038 .348 5.19 
 Op CF     Δ 
COGS 
    
CEO 2.208 109.315 1462.461 9.922 158. .063 .347 .132 .082 .088 
COO 1.976 97.119 .687 15.132 158. -.024 .110 -.016 .075 .088 
CFO -32.59 117.646 -13.729 40.216 158. .012 .151 .011 .091 .088 
Ops  56.390 119.413 24.112 85.569 158. -.055 .112 -.037 .146 .088 
Other  36.807 112.932 14.884 45.839 158. -.046 .368 -.103 .144 .088 
COO, ops  10.215 101.660 3.719 16.305 158. -.029 .109 -.019 .081 .088 
All -6.409 128.109 -2.940 36.272 158. .054 .266 .087 .167 .088 
 
 
 
